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Now that Catherine Ashton has been appointed the 
European Union’s High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, and that Herman van 
Rompuy has become the first permanent President 
of the European Council, a more fundamental 
question is: which foreign policy strategy will they 
actually pursue? 
In its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the 
EU has developed a grand strategy, embracing all 
foreign policy instruments and resources at the 
disposal of the EU and the Member States, but a 
partial one. The ESS tells us how to do things – in a 
preventive, holistic and multilateral way – but it is 
much vaguer on what to do: what are the foreign 
policy priorities of the EU? 
The recent debate about the ESS, resulting in the 
2008 Report on the Implementation of the 
European Security Strategy, failed to answer this 
question. Offering little in terms of 
recommendations for the future, the Report creates 
an impression of unfinished business, which the 
EU can ill afford now that the Treaty of Lisbon has 
strengthened the institutional set-up, NATO has 
launched a strategic debate to which an EU 
contribution is essential, and the EU risks being 
overshadowed by the much more purposive 
emerging powers.  
A fully-fledged strategic review is in order to 
complete the ESS. The first rule of strategy-making 
is to know thyself. Seemingly evident, it is actually 
not that clear which values and interests the EU 
seeks to safeguard, and which kind of international 
actor it wants to be. Therefore, the EU should start 
its strategic review by looking at itself and try to 
identify the purpose of its foreign policy. But there 
are many dangers in looking too much into the 
mirror, and furthermore the EU cannot pretend to 
become a strategic actor if it continues to ignore the 
The Lisbon Treaty now having entered 
into force, it is time for the EU to get 
back to work and more specifically to 
focus on its foreign policy. In a world 
that is increasingly complex and 
multipolar, the EU must act 
strategically. To avoid becoming an 
irrelevant international actor, Brussels 
needs to (1) develop a grand strategy to 
define the true purpose of its foreign 
policy; (2) forge solid strategic 
partnerships with key global players; 
and (3) contribute to the building of a 
new effective multilateral system which 
takes into account the new global 
structure of power. 
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other strategic players. This is not about knowing 
thy enemy (arguably the EU has no direct enemies, 
although strategic surprises should never be entirely 
ruled out1), but about knowing “the other”. Finally, 
a last principle of strategy-making could be: know 
thy environment, or to put it in other words, know 
the rules of the game. If the EU hopes to become a 
global power, it needs to understand – or better to 
shape – the rules defining international relations. 
A Need for a Grand Strategy 
Which values and interests should our grand 
strategy safeguard? Europe has a very distinctive 
social model, combining democracy, the market 
economy and strong government intervention. 
Preserving and strengthening this internal social 
contract between the EU and its citizens, 
guaranteeing them security, economic prosperity, 
political freedom and social well-being, is the 
fundamental objective of the EU, both internally 
and as a global actor. The conditions that have to 
be fulfilled to allow that constitute our vital 
interests: defence against any military threat; open 
lines of communication and trade (in physical as 
well as in cyber space); a secure supply of energy 
and other vital natural resources; a sustainable 
environment; manageable migration flows; the 
maintenance of international law and universally 
agreed rights; and autonomy of EU decision-
making. 
To safeguard these interests, the EU must be a 
power, i.e. a strategic actor that consciously and 
purposely defines long-term objectives, actively 
pursues these, and acquires the necessary means to 
that end. Which kind of power the EU chooses to 
be is in part conditioned by the international 
environment. Marked by interpolarity, defined as 
“multipolarity in the age of interdependence”2, that 
environment is very challenging, but at the same 
time presents the EU with an opportunity to pursue 
a distinctive grand strategy. This strategy is 
distinctive in the sense that the emphasis is on a 
holistic approach, putting to use the full range of 
instruments, through partnerships and multilateral 
                                                          
1 Colin S. Gray, “The 21st Century Security Environment and the 
Future of War”. Parameters, vol. 38:4 (2008), pp. 14-26. 
2 Giovanni Grevi, The Interpolar World: A New Scenario. Occasional 
Paper 79, Paris: EUISS, 2009, p. 9. 
institutions, for a permanent policy of prevention 
and stabilization. Contrary to US grand strategy for 
instance, the EU favours rule-based multilateralism, 
not just any form of multilateralism; and it 
promotes its values globally but does not try to 
enforce them.  
The approach which the EU has pursued so far is 
in line with this grand strategy, but practice has 
revealed a number of limitations. Especially vis-à-
vis other global actors the classic EU strategy of 
“positive conditionality”, i.e. the offer of benefits in 
return for security cooperation and economic, 
social and political reforms, has been rather 
unsuccessful. Interdependence is too great and the 
scale of things is too vast for the EU to have any 
serious leverage. On the contrary, pontificating 
without acting only serves to undermine EU soft 
power. 
A Need for Truly Strategic Partnerships 
In a world that is increasingly multipolar and 
interdependent – this is to say interpolar – the EU 
cannot continue to approach emerging global 
powers without a clear strategy. The EU has 
therefore created a new instrument to engage with 
other global actors: strategic partnerships. The 
actual strategy behind these is far from clear 
however. 
A first and major problem is the lack of 
understanding of the concept of strategic 
partnership. It has never been defined and is 
consequently seen and interpreted differently by 
many actors within the EU, without mentioning 
those outside the EU.  
Another major problem relates to the countries that 
qualify for a strategic partnership. There are few 
established criteria, except that partnerships can be 
signed with “third countries, and international, 
regional or global organisations which share the 
principles [of democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law]” (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 
22) and that “the strategic partner status is 
specifically intended to derive from the capacity of 
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a country to exert a significant influence on global 
issues”. 3 At this point, not counting relations with 
the US, Canada and NATO, the EU has or is 
negotiating seven strategic partnerships with other 
States (Brazil, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, 
and South Africa), and one with an international 
organization (the African Union). It seems quite 
obvious that not each of these is equally strategic. 
Most of these countries undeniably exercise 
regional leadership or are a significant player for 
one specific global issue. This makes them strategic 
as regards one region, or one issue. But is this a 
sufficient condition to make them a strategic 
partner? Can Mexico and South Africa really be put 
on an identical level with China, Russia and the 
United States?  
The danger is to overstretch the concept, leading to 
an amalgam between important relationships and 
strategic relationships. Such overstretch creates 
confusion within the EU, but also in the eyes of its 
partners and in the way they interpret Europe’s 
ambitions. In a sense we have been very successful 
at confusing our partners and becoming ever less 
strategic to them.  
So, how can we actually make the EU partnerships 
strategic? A truly strategic use of the strategic 
partnerships, i.e. in function of EU foreign policy, 
must start from a thorough assessment of EU 
interests in the various regions of the globe and a 
clearer definition of its objectives towards them. At 
the same time, a prioritization of actions to be taken 
to tackle the global challenges, in function of the 
Union’s vital interests, is in order. On many of 
these issues – climate, migration, energy – the EU 
already has elaborate policies – these must be 
integrated into its broader foreign policy 
framework.  
Rather than objectives in their own right, the 
strategic partnerships are instruments to further 
“effective multilateralism”. The EU could identify 
shared interests with each of its strategic partners, 
in order to establish in a number of priority policy 
areas effective practical cooperation with those 
strategic partners that share EU interests in that 
specific domain, with the ultimate aim of 
                                                          
3 “Towards an EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership”, COM(2008) 
447, Brussels, 15 July 2008. 
institutionalizing those forms of cooperation and 
linking them up with the permanent multilateral 
institutions. Such a pragmatic approach of 
coalition-building and practical cooperation, on 
very specific issues to start with, can expand into 
broader areas, including with regard to values. If 
e.g. it is unlikely that we will see China at the 
forefront of democracy promotion, it has an 
economic interest in promoting the rule of law, if 
only to ensure that the mining concessions it 
acquires are not simultaneously offered to someone 
else.  
Rather than asking with which State or organization 
a strategic partnership should be concluded, the EU 
should look beyond those already in existence and 
involve actors in constructive cooperation in 
function of their power in the specific area 
concerned. In practice, two types of partners may 
eventually emerge: those with which the EU 
establishes cooperation in a comprehensive range 
of areas – probably at least Russia, China and India, 
if they would be inclined to such cooperation that 
is, and of course the US; and those with whom 
cooperation focuses on a more limited range of 
issues or regions.  
For the strategic partnerships to work, the EU must 
speak with one voice – other global actors are only 
too adept at playing off one Member State against 
the other. “Self-divide and be ruled over” is not a 
strategy bound to serve European interests... At the 
very least, Member States should subscribe to a rule 
of transparency and automatically inform the EU, at 
an early stage, of all important bilateral 
arrangements with strategic partners, so as to allow 
for debate in the EU institutions and de-conflicting 
of potentially competing interests. Ideally, on key 
issues, strategic partnerships could establish the EU 
as the unique interlocutor on a series of key issues, 
hence limiting the margin of manoeuvre of 
individual Member States.  
With the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, a 
greater role could be devoted to the EEAS – 
instead of the Commission generally in charge of 
strategic partnerships to this day – in centralizing 
and coordinating the various strategic partnerships, 
linking them up with a coherent foreign policy.  
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Without strategy, the strategic partnerships will 
quickly become irrelevant. With a strategy, they can 
potentially become very effective instruments of a 
united European foreign policy. 
A Need for a Reformed Multilateralism 
Bilateral strategic partnerships will not be sufficient 
to shape the future global order, however – the 
multilateral architecture as such must also be 
reformed. If the world is surely becoming 
increasingly multipolar – or even interpolar – it is 
still unclear whether that multipolarity will lead to 
more cooperation or competition. History taught us 
that the emergence of new powers challenging the 
old order can lead to many different scenarios, 
depending on the players’ ability to adapt to each 
other and to their environment. We should also 
take from history that interpolarity is not inherently 
cooperation-driven, as illustrated by the 
competition between 19th century great powers in a 
world that was already multipolar and 
interdependent (even more interdependent than 
today, according to several indicators such as trade 
to GDP or capital flows4). 
The EU preference for a cooperative form of 
multipolarity is well-known as it constantly 
promotes an international order based on systemic 
and rule-based multilateralism referred to in 
Brussels jargon as “effective multilateralism”. This 
preference inscribes itself in a long-term strategy for 
promoting peace and multilateral cooperation, 
based on a strong historical conviction that 
multilateralism is the best avenue towards peace.  
A global reform of multilateralism is clearly in the 
interest of the EU which “would have nothing to 
gain and everything to lose if it operated in a world 
governed by unstable power games in which it was 
one among various competing power players”5. But 
a reform of multilateralism would also be in the 
                                                          
4 See Richard E. Baldwin, Philippe Martin, Two Waves of 
Globalisation: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences. NBER 
Working Paper 6904, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, January 1999. 
5 Alvaro de Vasconcelos, “Multilateralising Multipolarity”, in 
Giovanni Grevi and Alvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.), Partnerships for 
Effective Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and 
Russia. Chaillot Paper 109, Paris: EU Institute for Security 
Studies, May 2008, p. 24. 
general interest because we all have everything to 
lose and nothing to gain from a world governed by 
unstable power games if it leads to a paralysis in the 
resolution of key global challenges such as climate 
change and nuclear proliferation, for the entire 
system is equally threatened in the end. 
As stated in the 2003 ESS: “in a world of global 
threats, global markets and global media, our 
security and prosperity increasingly depend on an 
effective multilateral system.” And therefore, “the 
development of a stronger international society, 
well functioning international institutions and a 
rule-based international order is our objective. (…) 
We want international organisations, regimes and 
treaties to be effective in confronting threats to 
international peace and security, and must therefore 
be ready to act when their rules are broken.”6 
However, despite the fact that the EU arguably 
favours a multilateral approach to international 
relations7, it is important to point out that not all 
forms of multilateralism are favourable to the EU. 
For instance, the formation of ad hoc bilateral or 
multilateral alliances – especially those excluding the 
EU – could potentially be damaging to Europe; a 
G-2 between China and America e.g. would slowly 
but inevitably make the US lean towards Asia, and 
render Europe increasingly irrelevant. 
Moreover, even where the world is cooperative, it is 
only irregularly so, and in an unstructured manner 
at that. Our contemporary era could be dubbed the 
age of multi-multilateralism, defined as the 
strengthening of an asymmetrical and dynamic 
cooperation process in which (1) countries are 
becoming members of a variety of overlapping 
institutions, creating a new mosaic of multilateral 
interactions; (2) states meet continuously in multiple 
forums hence increasing the density of international 
relations; (3) formal institutions (e.g. the UN) 
cohabit with informal forums (e.g. the G20) in a 
                                                          
6 A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 9. 
7 We say “arguably” because EU rhetoric promotes effective 
multilateralism, but its actions might sometimes be seen by other 
parties – rightly or wrongly – as not faithful to that principle. 
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moving and overlapping configuration.8 
Nevertheless, even in the age of multi-
multilateralism, cooperation between global actors 
remains conditional and certainly not automatic. 
So, here is the obvious question: how do we get to 
an effective multilateral order? There is of course 
no clear-cut answer to that question, but our 
intuition tells us that we should start with what we 
already have, with a special attention to the latest 
developments, including the recent upgrading of 
the G20 from ministerial to head of state level, 
largely seen as a positive signal by emerging 
countries, indicating that they are now considered 
as key players in dealing with global challenges. This 
recognition was most welcome in New Delhi, 
Beijing and Brasilia.  
Somehow, the displacement of the G8 by the G20 
was also positive for the EU, at least for two 
reasons. First, Brussels is officially the 20th member 
of the G20, while it was only the 9th member of the 
G8. To many, this might only be a symbolic 
nuance, as in both cases the EU has the same 
“rights” and “obligations” as the other members 
minus the right to chair and host summits, hence 
no capacity to fully shape the agenda. But in 
international politics, rhetoric and the choice of 
words are never innocent; hence, in some way, the 
G20 is arguably a recognition of the “emerging” or 
“global power” status of the EU in international 
affairs as much as that of China, India or Brazil.  
Second, the EU might show a more united front 
within the G20 than within the G8 because past 
experience has shown that pre-summit cooperation 
and coordination was greater ahead of G20 than 
G8 summits.9 Since the level of meetings was 
upgraded to heads of state and the agenda enlarged, 
there is even a visible trend towards more internal 
cooperation, on the basis that a stronger European 
voice is needed in a forum where Europe represents 
only one fifth of the participants (as opposed to 
                                                          
8 Thomas Renard, A BRIC in the World: Emerging Powers, Europe, 
and the Coming Order. Egmont Paper 31, Brussels: Egmont – The 
Royal Institute for International Relations, October 2009, p. 15. 
9 Skander Nasra, Dries Lesage, Jan Orbie, Thijs Van de Graaf, 
Mattias Vermeiren, The EU in the G8 System: Assessing EU Member 
States’ Involvement. EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2009/45, San 
Domenico: European University Institute, September 2009. 
half in the G8). Indeed, ahead of the Pittsburgh 
summit, the EU gave a positive sign when releasing 
a communiqué stating the common “agreed 
language” for the Summit, which also contained 
declarations on development, climate change and 
energy security, i.e. topics mirroring a broader 
agenda for the G20. A stronger and more united 
European front will send a positive signal to our 
strategic partners. 
Nonetheless, regarding the role of the EU in the 
G20, two important questions remain open:  
(1) Who will represent the EU at the next G20 
Summit in Toronto next June? Indeed, the Treaty 
of Lisbon is not clear regarding to who will replace 
the President of the Commission and the rotating 
Presidency. Whether it is Van Rompuy or Ashton 
that accompanies José Manuel Barroso to Toronto 
might send a symbolic signal. But whoever is 
designated needs to strengthen European 
coordination within the G20 and to ensure 
coordination with the EEAS which should receive 
more authority in terms of foreign policy planning, 
including regarding global challenges and strategic 
partnerships. 
(2) How do we link the new G20 up with effective 
multilateralism? Indeed, if the empowerment of the 
G20 was a good option available to make sure 
emerging powers feel involved in the resolution of 
today’s global challenges, it can only be a transitory 
phase pending a broader reform of the global 
multilateral architecture. If we want Russia, China, 
India or Brazil to abide by the rules of the WTO, 
the IMF or the UN, we have to strengthen (and 
eventually reshape) these institutions. 
However, such reform will take time and a lot of 
difficult political decisions. In the meantime, the 
G20 can be used as a proxy to formal organizations 
provided it is globally accepted that it is only a 
temporary fix and that it does not replace but 
complements the UN Security Council. 
The development of the G20 as a temporary proxy 
for global institutions is a necessary exception to 
“effective multilateralism” because in today’s 
interpolar world most issues are globally 
interrelated, hence requiring enhanced cooperation 
and coordination among countries worldwide. Due 
  
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
6 
#1 
September 2009 
to its composition (all countries of significant 
importance are represented) the G20 constitutes at 
this time the best available forum to discuss 
effectively global challenges and ways to solve 
them. However, the EU must make sure that the 
decisions taken during the G20 comply with the 
international rules and are linked with and 
implemented through the permanent international 
organizations, e.g. UN agencies. 
Conclusion 
“Hell is other people” (“l’enfer c’est les autres”) 
wrote Jean-Paul Sartre, meaning that we define our 
own identity based on the perceptions and our 
relationship with other parties. If Sartre were to 
observe the EU today, becoming less and less 
relevant in the eyes of its significant others, he 
could very well come to the conclusion that he has 
unwittingly described the position of the EU in the 
international system... 
But the future lies in hope, not in despair. In order 
to find its place in a world characterized by moving 
asymmetrical multipolarity and multi-
multilateralism, the EU must start acting 
strategically now. Indeed, if the EU really wants to 
step from being a global actor – defined by global 
presence – to being a global power – defined by 
global influence – it needs a global strategy. It needs 
a grand strategy. 
This strategy will inevitably be conditioned by the 
global environment (interpolarity) but it should not 
be entirely dependent upon that environment, i.e. 
our strategy should aim at shaping the global 
environment as much as it will be shaped by it and 
avoid the trap of mere reactivity which has defined 
EU foreign policy so far. In the words of Brigadier-
General (Ret.) Jo Coelmont, “while the EU is 
playing ping pong, the others are playing chess”. 
With Van Rompuy and Ashton, Europe was 
offered a new King and a new Queen. So let’s play 
chess! 
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